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Given that it is difficult to monitor, and even more so to enforce, International 
Environmental Agreements, it is surprising that they are signed and implemented. This 
paper offers a theoretical model, which addresses the phenomena. The focus is on 
informational and coordination problems---a country which is unsure about the benefits 
of environmental policy may believe that the benefits are higher the greater the number of 
other countries which lean towards taking action. Whereas each country may individually 
take no environmental action, in equilibrium several countries may take environmental 
action if they expect others to. An International Environmental Agreement can thus be 
self-enforcing. Such effects can appear even if international environmental spillovers are 
absent, and even if monitoring and enforcement are infeasible. Our approach can explain 
additional phenomena: why a country that is known to care little about the environment 
may deeply influence other countries if it takes environmental action, why lags may 
appear between the signing of an agreement and its implementation, and how 
requirements for approval by several bodies within a country can increase support for 
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It is difficult to explain the existence of ambitious international environmental 
agreements. Take climate change as an example. Climate change is a pure world public 
bad, so that action to prevent it is a public good which can generate free riding. In 
addition, the benefits of reducing climate change are uncertain and come with a time lag 
of thirty to fifty years, due to the thermal inertia of the oceans. Both factors make climate 
change action difficult to sell for politicians.  
 
This paper explicitly considers the uncertainty involved in environmental policies, 
inquiring into how the action of one country influences the beliefs of another country 
about the benefits of action. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 sets out the basic 
ingredients of the model. Section 4 uses a model without international spillovers to 
illustrate the role of an International Environmental Agreement (IEA) as a signal for 
national policies. Section 5 adds the international spillovers to the model. Section 6 
brings in reputational concerns for politicians whose type is unknown by the voters. 
Section 7 brings in multiple political agents and analyzes their role in IEA’s.  
2. Literature 
 
An extensive literature discusses international environmental agreements. It is surveyed 
in two recent books by Barrett (2003,2007). Most of this literature considers each country 
as an individual player that has costs of emission reductions and suffers environmental 
damages. The costs are a function of one’s own efforts; the damage is a function of total 
emissions. Because international agreements are by nature not enforceable, most popular 
is the non-cooperative model: no international authority can impose efforts on every 
country and countries cannot even be forced to stick to the agreements they signed. The 
results of this non-cooperative model are rather pessimistic as this is a typical case of a 
pure public bad. Barrett (1994) considers a simple one-shot model with many identical 
countries and a pure public bad. He finds that in the simplest model, the number of 
signatories is at most three whatever the number of countries. The cooperative model 
allows for transfers across countries, and offers a partial or global agreement that benefits 
all parties by designing a system of transfers that makes all parties better off and 
produces the grand coalition (Chander & Tulkens (1994)). This solution, however, is 
difficult to enforce. More important for this paper is that none of these models detail the 
internal political phase..   
 
Two strands in the literature consider both the national political process and the 
international negotiation process. The first strand is a theoretical analysis of the median 
voter model. The second strand is an empirical approach. For example, Buchholz et al. 
(2005) suppose the median voter determines the negotiation position of a country 
followed by an international bargaining phase between countries. Their central result is 
that the median voter will select a very low environmental target because this allows him 
to receive a larger share of the gains of cooperation. The result is pessimistic: despite the presence of bargaining (cooperation) between countries, the outcome is an even weaker 
environmental agreement than the Nash non cooperative outcome predicts. This model 
has several drawbacks: it predicts very weak environmental agreements, it must assume 
that the bargaining outcome is enforced and it has only one political level in place: a 
parliament that executes the median voter preferences. Roelfsema (2007) proposes an 
alternative theoretical model and shows that if the median voter cares sufficiently for the 
environment, he has an incentive to delegate policy making to a politician that cares more 
for the environment than himself. By doing so, he mitigates the risks of a 'race to the 
bottom' in environmental taxes.  
 
The second strand is empirical and tries to explain the participation decisions in 
environmental agreements in function of the level of democracy. No structural model is 
specified. Congleton (1992) finds that democracies will more easily sign the Montreal 
Protocol
1 . But this is not such a strong test as, according to Barrett (2003), the non 
signatories (such as Eritrea and Iraq) are more like international outlaws. Murdoch et al. 
(2002) finds an opposite result in the sense that the Helsinki Protocol
2 was likely to be 
signed by countries that are more democratic. Frederiksson and Gaston (1999) find that 
democratic governments tend to sign an international agreement sooner. Murdoch and 
Sandler (1996) also find that voluntary cutbacks of CFC’s are higher in countries with 
more political freedom. Barrett (2003) is skeptical about this empirical work because the 
participation decision of countries are not independent decisions: some agreements only 
enter into force if there is a minimum participation.  
 
The evidence on IEAs is mixed and complex, perhaps because it is often difficult to 
measure the benefits and costs of IEA’s. Murdoch and Sandler (1997), studying the 
atmospheric ozone problem related to the use of CFC’s, show that the IEA mainly 
implements the non-cooperative equilibrium. Barrett (2003) reviews the making of 
several IEA’s and presents a complex story. He draws the attention to four important 
characteristics of IEA’s. First, IEA’s take often a long time to be signed. Second, IEA’s 
are first signed by the executive but only enter into force when they are ratified by 
parliament. Third, most IEA’s only enter into force if there is sufficient participation. 
Fourth, countries do not always observe the IEA they have adhered to. Huang (2002) 
considers how a country’s aversion to losing face by violating an international treaty can 
lead countries to abide with international environmental treaties.  
 
We will also draw upon the literature on  international trade agreements, on the 
credibility of national policies, and on political agency. Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 
(2007) use a model for trade negotiations where politicians rather than country 
preferences play a central role. International agreements are seen as a way to commit to 
industrial lobbies. Conconi and Perroni (2003) show how an international agreement can 
be enforced by a trigger strategy when the one-time gain from cheating on the agreement 
is sufficiently smaller than the discounted future cost of a “policy war,” and how such 
international cooperation can strengthen the credibility of domestic policy.  
                                                           
1 The Montreal protocol limits the emission of pollutants like CFC’s that contribute to the atmospheric 
ozone problem.  
2 The Helsinki protocol limits the sulfur emissions that contribute to acidification problem.  
We follow other work in supposing that policy can be more effective the more confident 
is the public that the state of nature makes the policy a good one. The essential idea that 
policy may lack credibility appears in works on trade protection (see Staiger and 
Tabellini (1987), Matsuyama (1990), and Tornell (1991)). The discussion of commitment 
in public policy relates to work by Strotz (1955-56), Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro 
and Gordon (1983), and Persson (1988). They show that current decisions of economic 
agents depend, in part, on their expectations of future policy. Phelps and Pollak (1968) 
apply the principle to determine optimal savings decisions. Alesina and Tabellini (1988) 
and Tabellini and Alesina (1990) extend these insights by showing that voters may favor 
budget deficits that constrain future public policy. Glazer (1989) applies these principles 
to demonstrate that collective choices will show a bias towards durable projects. 
 
Related studies examine how expectations of a policy change may change behavior in a 
way that increases political support for the policy under consideration. Cassing and 
Hillman (1986) show that a declining industry may suddenly collapse when its small size 
reduces political support for protective tariffs. Obstfeld (1986) shows that a balance-of-
payments crisis can be self-fulfilling when agents expect a speculative attack to set off an 
inflationary domestic-credit policy. Rodrik (1991) claims that trade liberalization will 
succeed if it induces the growth of firms that support such liberalization. Glazer and 
Hassin (1998) examine why government may avoid finding that a policy will fail, 
because such information would reduce the public's expectations that the program will be 





The state of nature, which determines the potential benefits of an environmental (Green) 
policy is uncertain. The state of nature can be either High (which makes a Green policy 
yield high benefits) or Low (which makes a Green policy yield low benefits). The prior 
probability that nature is in the High state is λ. For many environmental problems there is 
and was much uncertainty on the causes, the effects, and the valuation of the damages, 
and also uncertainty about the cost of policy actions. The uncertainty is only resolved 
gradually. Famous examples are stratospheric ozone formation and climate change. The 
role of CFC’s in damaging the stratosperic ozone layer was discovered by scientists in 
1974, but the different protocols restricting the emissions were only agreed in the period 
1985 to 1999 with increasingly precise estimates of the effects, benefits and costs of 
action. For climate change, the scientific evidence and the computation of benefits and 
costs of action started in the early 1990’s, and there is now still a large uncertainty on the 
ultimate effects, costs and benefits of actions (see Barrett (2003).   
 
A minister in charge of environmental policy can be either a Green (G) type or else a 
Brown (B) type. Each can take only one action: sign an international agreement and 
commit to an environmental (Green) policy or not. A Green policy is irreversible, with a 
sunk cost I. Each minister sees a signal about the state of nature (H or L); the signal is correct with probability s. The signal seen by the ministers may be different: even if the 
national scientists may have the same views on the physical mechanisms (for climate 
change via IPCC), there need be no consenus on the costs of climate change, on the costs 
of policies to reduce emissions, on the redistributive effects of policies, or on political 
support for proposed policies. We do suppose that estimates of the costs and benefits of a 
policy are positively correlated across countries.   
 
We consider two countries, i and j. The discounted additional benefit (before accounting 
for the sunk cost I) for each country of adopting a Green policy is  () H p W λ  or  () L p W λ
3. 
The benefit only depends on the state of the environment that materializes and on the 
posterior probability λ  that is used by the agents in that country. The posterior 
probability is important because it determines the preventive investments (R&D as well 
as green investments) by the general public. One reason is that the greater the confidence 
in the policy’s advisability, the more confident are firms or other investors (e.g., 
households buying cars) that the policy will be enforced, and so the more, or the earlier, 
they will invest. Alternatively, the public may care about environmental quality, and the 
more serious they think the problem is, the more is each person willing to spend on 
addressing the problem.  
p
 
The posterior probability λp is formed by the agents based on the prior probability λ and 
on the behavior of the politicians as they receive a signal on the state of the environment.  
 
Call λE the posterior belief about the state of nature held by a minister. The value of λE  
may differ from the value of λP because a minister observes his own signal, but the public 
only observes the actions of the ministers. The expected benefit to a Brown politician of 
adopting a Green policy is  () ( 1 ) () EH p E L p WW λλ λλ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ I + − ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ −
G I
. If he does not adopt a 
Green policy, his expected benefit is zero. The expected benefit to a Green politician of 
adopting a Green policy is  () ( 1 ) () EH p E L p WW λλ λλ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ + −+ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ −
                                                          
, where G is a positive 
parameter; it can reflect, his personal preferences or the influence of (green) special 
interest group lobbying as in Dixit et al. (1997). The model can equivalently be 
formulated as one where the Green politician defends the general interest and the Brown 
minister is bribed by special interest groups and has a specific utility B of not signing an 
environmental agreement. We come back to this interpretation later. 
 
We will use first models where everyone knows the type of the politician. For these 
models we use the following timeline for the game: 
1.  Nature determines the state of nature, either High or Low.  
2.  The minister in each country observes an imperfect signal of the state of 
nature. The probability of a correct signal is s.  
 
3 The benefit function integrates risk attitudes.   3.  Each minister decides whether to sign an environmental agreement, knowing 
what the other minister does. 
4.  The public forms its posterior probability as a function of the observed 
political actions 
5.  Each minister decides on environmental policy in his country. 
6.  The state of the environment is realized as High or Low, and the payoffs are 
determined.  
 
4. Participation in environmental agreements as a signal of the state 
of nature 
 
The benefits of environmental action can be uncertain and people only learn gradually 
about the damages. For a single decision maker this uncertainty raises the question 
whether he should delay action until more information is (Kolstad 1996). In the literature 
on international treaties, the impact of learning on the success of an IEA is not 
necessarily positive. Learning affects the strategic behavior of the different countries and 
this can lead to less powerful IEA’s. The conclusions (Kolstad and Ulph, 2007) in this 
domain are rather pessimistic: learning does not make IEAs more attractive.  
 
Here we take a different approach to learning and to IEAs. First, we assume that 
countries learn independently rather than collectively about the environmental problem. 
More importantly, in our model, a country’s behavior and welfare is not only a function 
of the number of participants in an IEA but also a function of the beliefs of its citizens 
and the type of political agent. Environmental action (signing an IEA) by one country can 
be seen as a signal of the importance of the environmental problem, and this extra signal 
can increase the participation of countries and in this way also the internal credibility of 
the environmental policy.  
We consider three cases: both ministers are Green, both ministers are Brown, and one is 
Green while the other is Brown. Our model supposes that the different types of ministers, 
Green and Brown, show different biases. We can make two different assumptions. One is 
that Brown ministers will never adopt a Green policy (a policy that ameliorates 
environmental problems), but that a Green minister who is sufficiently confident that the 
state of nature favors a Green policy will adopt a Green policy. In this case, a Green 
minister learns nothing from the behavior of a Brown minister, but can learn from a 
Green minister in the other country about the likely state of nature. The alternative 
assumption is that a Green minister will always favor a Green policy, but that a Brown 
minister will favor a Green policy only if he is sufficiently confident that the state of 
nature favors a Green policy. Here, a Brown minister can learn from a Brown minister, 
but not from a Green minister, in the other country. Analytically, it does not matter which 
approach we adopt. We arbitrarily choose to examine the case where a Brown minister 
may be persuaded to take action by learning what another Brown minister did. Thus, we assume that G is so large, that a Green politician always signs the international 
environmental agreement. We shall see that in equilibrium, a minister who signs an 
international environmental agreement will want to implement a Green policy. 
Case 1: Both ministers are Green. Then they both sign the IEA. The public’s posterior 
probability that the state of nature is High is equal to the prior probability λ because the 
public knows that Green ministers favor a Green policy regardless of the state of nature.  
Case 2: Both countries have Brown ministers. Here we must distinguish three cases: both 
saw signal H, both saw signal L, and one saw signal H while the other saw signal L.  
Case 2.A If both saw signal H, the posterior probability that the state of nature is H is:  
^ ²











which is greater than λ.  
Assumption A1. The value of 
^ HiH j
E λ  is sufficiently large so that a Brown minister 
would sign the agreement if he knows that both ministers saw an H signal  . 
















Assumption A2. The value of 
^^ ^ () ( 1 ) (
Li Lj Li Lj Li Lj Li Lj
EH p E L p W λλ λλ
^ ) W ⎡ ⎤⎡ +− ⎤ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦  is sufficiently 
small so that if both ministers saw an L signal, no Brown minister would sign an 
environmental agreement or adopt a Green policy). Under this assumption, the general 
public will infer the same posterior probabilities as the political agent.  
Case 2.C Two Brown ministers where one (say i) saw signal L and one (say j) saw signal 
H. The posterior probability that the state of nature is High is 
^ (1 )
.













^^ HiL j L iL j
EE λλ > : the probability that the state of nature is H is clearly larger when 
one minister saw an H signal than when none did.  
Assumption A3. The value of
^ HiL j
E λ is sufficiently small so that a Brown minister would 
not commit to an environmental policy if he saw a High signal and the other country saw a Low signal. (). Under assumptions A1,A2 and A3, the general public, knowing the type 
and the objective functions, will infer in cases 2.A, 2.B and 2.C  the same posterior 
probabilities as the political agent. 
Under these assumptions, welfare may be higher when both ministers are Brown than 
when both ministers are Green. The point is that if both Brown ministers favor a Green 
policy, then the public has far more confidence that the state of the environment is High 
than when Green ministers adopta Green policy. More formally, expected benefits in 
each country when both ministers are Green are  () ( 1 ) ()  -  WW I HL λ λλ λ + −
^^ ^ ^ Hi Hj Hi Hj Hi Hj Hi Hj I
 because the 
Green governments agree to sign an environmental agreement whatever the signal 
received so that the posterior probability of the public equals the prior probability. 
Expected benefits when both ministers are Brown are 
 , where the posterior probabilities of the 
public are equal to those of the political agent. Under our assumptions (A1, A2, A3), an 
environmental policy is only justified if signals HH are received. This implies that   
though under Brown ministers an environmental agreement is less likely to be adopted, 
the increased confidence that a Green policy is adopted only when it will have large 
benefits makes welfare larger under Brown than under Green ministers 
() ( 1 ) () HL Ep E p WW λλ λ λ +− −
Note also the benefits to Brown ministers of coordinating their actions. Neither one alone 
may be willing to undertake a Green policy; but if one country expects the other to adopt 
a Green policy, then each would be willing to adopt it. An International Environmental 
Agreement can provide such coordination. Moreover, such an IEA would be self-
enforcing. Also note that the benefits of an IEA here arise not from direct spillovers from 
the environmental policy (indeed, the environmental policy may affect environmental 
policy only within the country which adopts it), but from informational externalities.Case 
3: One country has a Green Minister, and the other has a Brown minister 
The third case to consider has a Green minister in one country (say country i) and a 
Brown minister in the other (say country j). The Green minister, by assumption, always 
adopts a Green policy. Therefore, his action gives no information about the state of nature. 
A Brown minister who sees an H signal calculates the posterior probability that the state 












Again, the public may learn from the Brown government if it is beneficial to sign an 
environmental agreement and this will increase the credibility of policy and the efforts of 
the public.   
One should ask if an IEA is identical to a form of cheap talk. The answer, with one 
exception, is Yes in our case without international environmental spillovers and without 
economies of scale in producing abatement. The analysis we gave would apply if, instead of two countries signing an IEA, the prime minister in each country each announced that 
he would adopt a Green policy. But, as this example suggests, an IEA has an advantage 
over other coordination mechanisms---the negotiations can be done in secret. Thus, 
suppose a prime minister incurs a cost, even a very small one, for announcing a policy 
that he later reverses, or for revealing that his estimate of the state of nature is wrong. 
Suppose that a Brown minister in country i is unsure what a Brown minister in country j 
will announce until after country i makes its announcement. Then with some positive 
probability, country i will announce a Green policy, whereas country j, seeing a different 
signal, does not adopt a Green policy. Though country i could later reverse its policy, a 
minister who does so may incur a reputational cost. Therefore, ministers in the two 
countries may prefer to engage in secret negotiations, jointly agreeing to announce a 
Green policy only if both saw that the state of nature is Green. It can be the very secrecy 
of negotiations leading to an IEA which can make them effective and appealing. 
Sequential policy 
In the Nash equilibrium we described, both Brown ministers may adopt a Green policy. 
Matters can differ if countries can act sequentially, say country i setting policy before 
country j does. When country i chooses policy, it knows only its own signal of the state 
of nature. If it sees an H signal, its posterior probability that the state of nature is High is 
Hj
E λ . It will sign an environmental agreement only if 
 where the posterior probability of the public 
equals that of the politician. If this condition is satisfied, then country i signs an IEA, and 
country j will also sign if it sees an H signal. 
() ( 1 ) () 0 HL Ep E p WW λλ λ λ +− −> .
Hi Hi Hi Hi I
0 I
^^ ^ ^ 0
Hi Hj Hi Hj Hi Hj Hi Hj I
More interesting results apply with the following assumption, that a Brown minister 
adopts a Green policy only if he expects the other country to do so too: 
Assumption A4.   but 
. 
() ( 1 ) ()
Hi Hi Hi Hi
HL Ep E p WW λλ λ λ +− −<
() ( 1 ) () HL Ep E p WW λλ λ λ +− −>
Suppose that a Green policy is irreversible, and can be adopted in either period 1 or 2. 
Then it cannot be a Nash equilibrium for a Brown minister to adopt a Green policy in 
period 1---the minister could do better by delaying to period 3, making a decision only 
after observing whether the other country adopted a Green policy in period 2. But it is a 
Nash equilibrium for no country to adopt a Green policy in either period. Given that 
behavior, a Brown minister who sees a H signal estimates the posterior probability that 
the state of nature is H as 
Hi λ , which by assumption does not justify a Green policy. 
We can see here how an IEA can increase welfare by adding a minimum participation 
constraint before it comes into force. In our sequential setting, the Brown minister will 
sign if he observes H because he knows it will only bind him if the Brown minister in the 
other country also observes H. This guarantees him that signing is the right decision 
(given A4).  This story can explain why countries sign IEAs even if spillover effects are small. 
5. International environmental spillovers 
We so far supposed that policy in a country directly affects only the citizens in that 
country; for a given policy, no country cares what policy is in the other country. We now 
extend the analysis to have environmental policy generate externalities---welfare in one 
country is higher if the other country adopts a Green policy. Such externalities can 
generate strategic behavior in the sequential case---a minister in one country may adopt 
an environmental policy to induce the other country to adopt also an environmental 
policy. We first discuss the simultaneous case.  
Simultaneous action 
As before, we suppose that each minister knows his own type, and the other minister’s 
type but observes only his own signal. In the simultaneous case we need to examine the 
Nash equilibrium. In a Nash equilibrium, strategic behavior makes no sense: for any 
given action by country j, country i will want to maximize direct benefits, without 
considering how a change in its action will affect j’s action. 
The net benefit of signing an environmental agreement is now a function of four 
parameters:   where x (,,)( 1 )(,,) , EH p i j E L p i j i Wx x Wx x x λλ λ λ +− −
ii I i is a 0,1 variable that is 
1 when the country signs the environmental agreement and 0 otherwise. The 
environmental spillovers imply that welfare in county i depends directly on the 
environmental policy in country j via the damage of foreign emissions. Welfare in 
country i continues to depend indirectly on the environmental policy in j via its effect on 
the posterior probability of agents in both countries. As citizens in both countries observe 
the same signals (signing or not by i and j), the posterior probabilities formed by the 
public in both countries are the same.  
We again assume that Green politicians sign an international environmental agreement 
regardless of the state of nature. Having a Green in power has the advantage that it solves 
the international spillover problem but is not a clear signal to the public of the state of 
nature. Depending on the importance of the citizens’ own investments, signing an 
international environmental agreement combined with low posterior probabilities of the 
general public may not be welfare improving.  
A first interesting case is where signing an environmental agreement is only worthwhile 
for a country if both signals point to a High state of nature, and both countries effectively 
sign the agreement. We limit ourselves to the case where both countries received an H 
signal. We can distinguish two cases:  
Case A Beliefs of citizens are important  
We assume more precisely that it is better for a country to sign if the other signs. In 
addition if the other has not signed, it is better also not to This assumption is more justified for the case where the credibility of internal policy is an important factor. More 
precisely Assumption_A5: 
 
( ,1,1) (1 ) ( ,1,1) ( ,0,1) (1 ) ( ,0,1)
( ,1,0) (1 ) ( ,1,0) ( ,0,0) (1 ) ( ,0,0).
EH p E L p E H p EL p
HH H H H H
EH p E Lp EH E L
WW I W W
WW I W W
λλ λ λ λ λ λλ
λλ λ λ λλ λ λ
+− −> +−
+− −< +−
HH HH HH HH H H H H
This means we have a coordination game where there are two Nash equilibria: both adopt 
a Green policy, and neither does. The case where both adopt a Green policy is clearly 
better and will be the outcome as international agreements fulfill exactly this coordination 
role.  
Case B Beliefs are unimportant  
Now we assume that the posterior probability of the agents is less important for the 
outcomes. What really matters is one’s effort (the sunk cost I) to reduce emissions, 
generating the traditional free-rider problem. Each minister avoids a Green policy if the 
other did, and each adopts a Green policy if the other does 
Assumption A6.  
    
( ,1,1) (1 ) ( ,1,1) ( ,0,1) (1 ) ( ,0,1)\
( ,1,0) (1 ) ( ,1,0) ( ,0,0) (1 ) ( ,0,0).
HH HH HH HH H H H H
EH p E L p E H p EL p
HH H H H H
EHp E Lp EH E L
WW I W W
and
WW I W W
λλ λ λ λ λ λλ
λλ λ λ λλ λ λ
+− −< +−
+− −< +−
Adding the signaling function to the analysis of IEA’s leads to more frequent 
participation in IEA’s.  
Sequential case 
In this case strategic behavior may be present in the signals of countries. Our first goal is 
to demonstrate that sincere policy may not be an equilibrium. To make the problem 
meaningful, we suppose that country i moves in period 1, and country j moves in period 2.  
Suppose, as before, that a Brown minister will sign an IEA (and adopt a Green policy) 
only if he is sufficiently confident that the state of nature is H. Suppose all ministers are 
Brown.  
We can now no longer require that a Brown minister needs assurance on two High 
signals before he signs an IEA as there would never be any agreement in the sequential 
case. We therefore assume that a Brown minister who only sees his own High signal 
would favor a Green policy 
 Assumption A7.    but 
 where the posteriors of the public 
equal those of the politicians. 
( ,1, ) (1 ) ( ,1, ) 0
Hi Hi Hi Hi
HL Ep j E p j Wx Wx I λλ λ λ +− −>
( ,1, ) (1 ) ( ,1, ) 0 HL p Ej E p j Wx W x I λλ λ λ +− −<




Under sincere action and assumption A7, country i would adopt a Green policy only if its 
minister saw a High signal. Suppose it followed this strategy, and consider next the 
decision faced by country j in period 2, after it observed country i rejecting a Green 
policy. If country j saw a High signal, it would avoid a Green policy if  
^^ ^ ^
^^ ^ ^
(, 0 , 1 ) ( 1 ) (, 0 , 1 )
( ,0,0) (1 ) ( ,0,0).
Li Hj Li Hj Li Hj Li Hj
HL Ep E p
Li Hj Li Hj Li Hj Li Hj








Where posteriors of the citizens are again equal to those of the politician.  
If, instead, country i always  adopted a Green policy, then its action is uninformative, and 
country j will adopt a Green policy if 
.   
(, 0 , 1 ) ( 1 ) (, 0 , 1 )
( ,0,0) (1 ) ( ,0,0).
Hj Hj Hj Hj
HL Ep E p
Hj Hj Hj Hj







We can now return to the decision by country i. It has an interest to behave strategically 
and to sign an agreement if the benefit of doing so is larger than the cost I: 
( ,1,1) ( ,0,1) (1 ) ( ,1,1) ( ,0,1) .
LH HH LH LH HH LH
EH p H p E H p H p WW WW λλ λ λ λ λ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ −+ − − ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦  
If the first mover behaves strategically when it sees a Low signal, adopting a Green 
policy, then it induces country j to adopt a Green policy. This expression is positive if the 
benefit spillover is sufficiently large. 
6. Reputational concerns  
 
We have so far assumed that citizens know the type of minister (Brown or Green) in each 
country. Here we explore behavior when citizens are unsure about a minister’s type, and 
a minister cares about what citizens believe about his type. In particular, suppose that 
uncertain benefits of environmental action may lead the voters to be skeptical about a 
vigorous environmental policy. Whenever one’s government takes unilateral action it 
may be considered suspect and may be a sign of not pursuing the interest of the country. 
Whenever more countries sign an agreement, the voters may perceive their own country’s 
policy as better justified. The IEA can then be seen as a collusive action by politicians to 
protect their private interests and to help them to get re-elected.  
 To analyze this issue we consider again two types of politicians: Browns in the 
proportion β  and Greens in the proportion1 β − . Each minister knows his own type and 
the other minister’s type, but the public does not. The public believes that the prior 
probability that the state of nature is High isλ . 
 
Consider the reputational effects arising when ministers act independently, ignoring 
reputational considerations. A minister would then adopt a Green policy if he is Green, or 
else if he is Brown and knew the state of nature is H. When the state of nature is H, he 
sees a signal that it is H with probability s. Since the state of nature is H with 
probabilityλ , a Brown minister who has no reputational consideration would adopt a 
Green policy with probability s λ . Therefore, the probability that the minister who 
adopted a Green policy is Green is
1




−+ = .  
 
Consider next reputational effects when ministers would adopt a Green policy only if 
both agree to it. That will happen only if both are Green, or if both are Brown but saw a 
High signal, or if one is Green and the other is a Brown who saw a High signal. Thus, the 
probability that a minister who jointly adopted a Green policy is a Green type is 
2
22
(1 ) (1 )




ββ λ β λ β
−+ −
−+ − + = 2  
 
G1>G2 and the more so, the more Brown politicians there are. This means that the 
signing of an international environmental agreement can indeed serve to protect the 
reputation of a Brown politician.  
 
7. Extensions  
 
The essential element of our model is that one agent can learn from the action or 
preferences of another. We have been considering only two agents per country, one 
politician and one representative citizen. But the model can easily be extended to more 
agents. A direct extension is to consider more than two countries. With two countries, the 
posterior probability 
Li λ  and 
Hj λ may not be sufficiently high to induce either country to 
adopt a Green policy. But if more countries independently see signals that the state of 
nature would make environmental policy effective, then the posterior probability (say, 
with three countries,
^^ HiH jH k λ ) can be sufficiently high to induce action. 
 
The number of agents reporting on their signals can be increased in other ways. IEAs are 
commonly negotiated by the executive branch, but require ratification by the legislature 
in each country. If the legislature in a country sees a signal which is not perfectly 
correlated with that seen by the executive, then ratification of an IEA provides further 
information about the state of nature. We are not here saying merely that a country is less 
likely to err if both the executive and the legislature must independently agree to a policy. 
We are making the different point that the legislature in country i may be more willing to 
adopt a Green policy if both the legislature and the executive in country j favor the IEA 
than if only the executive in country j does.  
 Pursuing this reasoning, confidence in the advisability of a Green policy can also be 
raised when successive ministers, each seeing his own signal of the state of nature, finds 
that Green policy would be good. That is, the public, or the legislature, may be more 
willing to support a Green policy if successive ministers (either in their own country or in 
other countries) support a Green policy, rather than if only the incumbent minister did. 
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